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According to the life-cycle theory, consumption as a fraction of income varies with
age. Taking this argument one step further, a country’s saving rate depends on the
age-structure of its population. This direct link between demographics and savings,
investments, and capital ﬂows has been addressed in a number of papers. Fair and
Dominguez (1991) ﬁnd mixed evidence for this story using quarterly U.S. data, while
Higgins and Williamson (1997), Higgins (1998), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001)
ﬁnd strong support for the story using lower-frequency data for a large number of
countries.
In this paper, we use another approach to examine the same link from demographics
to savings, investment, and international capital ﬂows. Rather than directly testing
for correlations between a country’s age-structure and these macroeconomic vari-
ables, we use a standard neoclassical model that is consistent with the life-cycle
theory. We calibrate this model with population data and projections for a large
number of countries, and examine if the data generated by the model can explain
real-world capital ﬂows.
In addition to controlling for the domestic age-distribution this approach allows us
to control for a changing demographic structure in the world economy. In the coming
decades, most developed countries will face aging populations and smaller fractions
of prime-age workers in the population. Theory and the empirical results found by
for example Higgins (1998) then predict that current account balances will fall. It is
not possible, however, that all countries simultaneously run current account deﬁcits.
The correlations between age-structure and capital ﬂo w sw i l lt h e nn o tb er o b u s t . 1
We get around this problem by using a general equilibrium model, where we force
the sum of current accounts in the world economy to balance in each period.
Many studies (see the survey below) have used calibrated models similar to ours
to examine the consequences of population aging. These studies have typically not
tested the model’s ability to explain historical data. Our paper therefore also con-
tributes by providing a test of the standard model used frequently in the literature.
We ﬁnd that the model generates data that can explain a small but signiﬁcant
fraction of capital ﬂows between countries. This ﬁnding both reinforces the results
in previous empirical studies documenting a correlation between age-distributions
and capital ﬂows, and supports the use of calibrated life-cycle models to study the
eﬀects of demographic change.
The model performs better when we restrict attention to data from 1985 and on-
wards. This result is consistent with the low mobility of capital documented by
1Higgins (1998) was well aware of this problem. For example, he argued that "out-of-sample
projections cannot capture the general equilibrium eﬀects of a novel pattern of global demographic
change" (p. 366)
1Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and Blanchard and Giavazzi’s (2002) ﬁnding that
capital has become more mobile in the last two decades.
As already mentioned, a number of studies use calibrated life-cycle models to ex-
amine how population aging will aﬀect saving and capital ﬂows. Much of this work
either treat economies as closed (following Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ, 1987), or as
small open economies facing exogenous and constant factor prices (following Auer-
bach et al., 1989). Exceptions exist, though. Cutler et al. (1990) use a two-region
model for the United States and the non-U.S. OECD countries and ﬁnd that the
U.S. demographic transition is aﬀected by capital inﬂows from the other OECD
countries. Attanasio and Violante (2000) examine how the Latin American demo-
graphic transition would be aﬀected by capital mobility and Brooks (2003), Flodén
(2003), Feroli (2002), and Henriksen (2002) all look at capital ﬂows in multi-region
models. All these papers suggest that demographic change can have a substantial
impact on capital ﬂows, and that international capital mobility can aﬀect macroeco-
nomic eﬀects of the demographic transition. Brooks, Feroli and Henriksen also ﬁnd
that their model implications are broadly consistent with historical capital ﬂows,
although they do not perform any formal testing as in the present paper.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 2. In Section 3
we describe how we calibrate and solve the model. In Section 4 we compare capital
ﬂows implied by the model with real-world data. Finally, in Section 5 we examine
the model’s implications for future capital ﬂows.
2 The Model
We consider a model of a world economy. Each country is populated by overlapping
generations of households that solve a standard life-cycle consumption problem. The
demographic development is exogenous and the production technology is identical
across countries, except that we allow for permanent diﬀerences in factor produc-
tivity. We assume that labor is immobile but that capital can move freely between
countries.
2.1 The household’s optimization problem
Households enter the labor market at age 20, raise an exogenous number of children
between ages 20 and 49,a n dd i ea ta g eN or earlier. Survival between periods is
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Here β is the discount factor, φs−1,s denotes the survival probability from period s−1
to period s, and Φs = Φ19
Ys
σ=20 φσ−1,σ is the unconditional probability that the
h o u s e h o l di sa l i v ea td a t es.W en o r m a l i z eΦ19 =1 . Θ is a parameter determining
the importance of bequests, b,a n dNb d e n o t e st h ea g ea tw h i c hb e q u e s t sa r eg i v e n .
Total household consumption is denoted by c,a n dψ is the number of consumption
equivalents in the household. Labor supply in eﬃciency units, h, is exogenous but
depends on age. Finally, r, w, y,a n da denote the interest rate, the wage rate,
income, and assets.2
2.2 Production
The representative ﬁrm in a country takes the world market price of capital, r,a s














1−θ − (rt + δ)Kt − Ξ(Kt−1,K t)
i
subject to a given K0. Here Zt is labor productivity, δ is the depreciation rate of
capital, and Ξ is cost associated with changing the size of the capital stock. Firms
are owned by domestic workers in proportion to their labor supply.3
The ﬁrst order condition to the ﬁrm’s problem is then
θ(ZtHt/Kt)




where subscripts on Ξ denote derivatives.
2To simplify notation, subscripts s on prices r and w denote time relative to a household’s entry
on the labor market, while subscripts t will be used to denote actual time.
3Workers are thus paid their marginal product when adjustment costs for capital are zero. When
adjustment costs are non-zero, the wage deviates slightly from the marginal product of labor.
32.3 Equilibrium
Let R={r1,r 2,...,r∞} denote the interest rate path, and let Wi = {wi,1,w i,2,...,wi,∞}
and Ki = {Ki,1,K i,2,...,K i,∞} denote the paths for wages and capital in country i.
Furthermore, let Ai,t (R,W,ai,t,20)={ai,t,21,a i,t,22,...,aN+1} denote the asset path
chosen by a household in country i that enters the labor market at time t with
initial assets ai,t,20 and similarly let Bi,t (R,W,ai,t,20)=bi,t denote the household’s




where Pi,t,s denotes the number of people of age s in country i at date t. Finally, let
¯ Ai,t =
PN
s=20 Pi,t,sai,t−s+1,s denote total asset holdings in country i at date t.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium consists of a world-market interest rate path R,c o u n t r y -
speciﬁc paths for wages and capital stocks Wi and Ki, and household decisions Ai,t
and Bi,t,s u c ht h a t
1. The world market for capital clears,
P
i
¡ ¯ Ai,t − Ki,t
¢
=0for all t.






1−θ − (rt + δ)Ki,t − Ξ(Ki,t−1,K i,t)
i
/Hi,t
for all i and t.
3. Household plans Ai,t and Bi,t solve the household’s optimization problem (1)
for all i and t.
4. The path for the capital stock, Ki,i sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hﬁrm optimization (2) in
all countries i.
3 Calibration and Solution
Our strategy is to use current account data generated by the model and test its
ability to predict and explain real-world current account data. The model economy
has to be calibrated with population data and parameter values. We assume that
the economy is in an initial steady state in year 1899. In the beginning of year 1900
agents learn about the future demographic development and adjust their decisions.
There is no demographic change after year 2050, and eventually the economy settles
down in a new steady state.
4In period 1, households also enter the economy at ages above 20, and with initial assets ai,1,·.
4The model economy consists of 18 OECD countries and one country representing the
rest of the world.5 The population data (P) is based on the United Nations (2002),
and survival probabilities φ are those implied by the development of P.6 Households
aged 20 to 49 share the burden of raising children, and child consumption is 50







j=20 Pi,t,j if 20 ≤ s ≤ 49
1 if s ≥ 50
The household dies with certainty at age 100.
Variations in labor productivity across countries are taken from table E7 in Maddison
(2001).7 We assume that these relative levels remain over time by assuming that the
growth rate of labor productivity is constant at one percent per year in all countries
(Zi,t+1/Zi,t =1 .01). Clearly, assuming that relative labor productivity is constant
over time is not realistic, but we have chosen to abstract from convergence so that
we can isolate the demographic eﬀects on capital ﬂows.
A household’s eﬃcient labor supply h varies with age due to changes in productivity
and labor market participation. As in Flodén (2003) we multiply Hansen’s (1993)
productivity estimates with Fullerton’s (1999) participation rates, and we assume
that the resulting labor-supply proﬁle is constant over time and across countries.
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in the utility and production func-
tions. Since the United Nations provide population data and forecasts in ﬁve-year
intervals and sorts the population in ﬁve-year age groups, we transform our model
into the same ﬁve-year structure. The parameter values for risk aversion (µ), the
discount factor (β), the capital share in production (θ), and the depreciation rate
of capital (δ) are standard and need no comment. Rather arbitrarily, we assume
that all bequests are given just before age 70 (Nb =1 4 ). The main motivation for
this assumption is technical. The annuity markets for savings simplify the solution
of the model. A natural modeling approach with annuity markets would be to let
bequests accrue to the survivors so that those who die at the ﬁnal age (100)l e a v e
all the bequests. However, only a small fraction of households survive until age 100,
5The 18 countries are the old OECD countries except Greece, Iceland, and Luxembourg. We
have also excluded Norway since its current account is dominated by the eﬀects of the oil ﬁndings.
6The UN reports population data in ﬁve-year intervals and for ﬁve-year cohorts. The population
aged 80+ was lumped together in one group until 1990. We split this group into ﬁve-year cohorts
by using survival probabilities from Bell et al. (1992). We use their tables for cohorts born in 1900,
1930, 1960, and 1990 and then interpolate to obtain survival probabilities for other years. These
survival probabilities refer to US data. We use this data for all OECD countries, but we lag the
data 30 years before using it on the rest of the world.
The UN population data ranges from 1950 to 2050. We assume that the population size and
structure was constant at the 1950 level before 1950 and that it will be constant at the 2050 level
after 2050.
7The productivity values vary between 21.94 1990 dollars per hour for Spain and 34.55 for the
USA. Maddison does not report values for Portugal or "the rest of the world". We use Spain’s
value for Portugal and ten percent of the U.S. level for the rest of the world.
5and the accumulated bequest per survivor would be enormous, resulting in poor
numerical precision in the solution algorithm. Taking into account intergenerational
gifts and life expectancy, we argue that age 70 is a realistic choice. The prefer-
ence parameter Θ aﬀects the equilibrium interest rate and was chosen to get a ﬂat
life-cycle consumption proﬁle in the initial steady state.









She estimates that α =1 .8197 in the United States, and her estimates for a number
of other OECD countries are similar. In the baseline speciﬁcation we set ξ =0 .20,
resulting in equilibrium adjustment costs around two percent of output. The case
with no adjustment costs, ξ =0 , is also considered.






δ 1.085 − 1
γ 1.015 − 1
ξ 0.20
α 1.8197
To solve the model, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the initial steady state. From this steady state, we
get the initial capital stocks for the 19 countries in year 1900, as well as the initial
distribution of asset holdings across households of diﬀerent ages. We then guess an
interest rate path for years 1900 to 2149. When there are no adjustment costs for
capital, the demographic development together with this interest rate path directly
imply paths for the capital stocks in each country, and one common path for wages.
In the presence of adjustment costs, we use an equation solver to ﬁnd each country’s











where subindices on Ξ denote derivatives. After having found the capital stock, we




1−θ − (rt + δ)Ki,t − Ξ(Ki,t−1,K i,t)
Hi,t
.
6Knowing these factor prices, we solve for the consumption-savings decision for each
household in each country from year 1900 and onward. We then sum all capital
stocks implied by ﬁrm optimization to obtain a path for the world total capital
stock, and similarly we sum all asset holdings implied by household optimization.
If asset holdings do not equal the sum of capital stocks in each period, an equation
solver updates the interest rate path and starts over.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium interest rate path for the baseline calibration of
the model. As the fraction of prime-age workers falls, the productivity of capital
and hence the interest rate declines. The resulting current account balances for the
OECD countries are shown in Figures 2 and 4 below. The "rest of the world" is
running current account deﬁcits throughout the period. These deﬁcits are around
seven percent between 1960 and 2000, and then gradually improves to around one
percent in 2050. Although 87 percent of the model population lived in the rest of
the world in year 2000, this region did not dominate capital ﬂows. Because of the
low labor productivity, production and the capital stock in the rest of the world only
amounted to 37 percent of the world total.
4 Does the Model Explain Current Account Data?
We want to examine if capital ﬂows implied by the model explain real-world current
accounts in the 18 OECD countries that were used to calibrate the model. These
current account data are from OECD (2003) and ranges from 1960 to 2003. For
most countries, however, the data series starts in the 1970’s. Let Xi,t denote the
current account balance generated by the model in country i and time period t.
Similarily, let CAi,t denote the average current account balance in the OECD data
for the same time period. To test the predictive power of the model, we use the
ﬁxed eﬀects panel speciﬁcation
CAi,t = αi + βXi,t.
Table 2 summarizes the regression results. The ﬁr s tt w oc o l u m n sr e p o r tr e s u l t s
using model data from our baseline speciﬁcation while columns 3-10 report results
using data from diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model. The diﬀerent speciﬁcations we
consider are to remove adjustment costs for capital (columns 3 and 4), to exclude
the "rest of the world" (columns 5 and 6), to introduce a pay-as-you-go deﬁned-
beneﬁts pension systems in all countries (columns 7 and 8), and reducing the degree
of risk aversion to unity (columns 9 and 10). In the model with a pension system,
we assume that contributions in the initial steady state are four percent of labor
income. Pension beneﬁts per retiree are then ﬁxed relative to the average wage but
pension contributions increase over time because of the demographic development.
The average pension tax is 7 and 15 percent in year 2000 and year 2050, respectively.
7A number of interesting results emerge. First, β is signiﬁcant and has the correct
sign in all regressions. Note that if the model were to match the data perfectly, β
would equal unity. Second, a substantial fraction of current account ﬂuctuations is
explained by the model. In the real world, current accounts are determined by many
factors in addition to demographic change, for example business cycle ﬂuctuations,
long-term growth trends, and volatile ﬁscal policy. Still, the model explains more
than ten percent of the current account ﬂuctuations. Third, the model explains
more of the data, and the parameter estimates are closer to unity when considering
the period 1985-2003. This can be understood as follows. A fundamental assump-
tion behind our work is that capital can move freely between countries. Contrary to
this assumption, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that the correlation between
a country’s investment and saving rate was close to unity in a sample of OECD
countries between 1960 and 1974. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, however, many
countries removed restrictions on international capital ﬂows, and in particular the
European economies became more internationally integrated. Blanchard and Gi-
avazzi (2002) consequently ﬁnd that the correlation between investment and saving
diminished after 1975 and in particular after 1990. Consistent with these ﬁndings,
we ﬁnd that the parameter estimates for the period 1960-1984 and 1985-2003 are
statistically diﬀerent at the 5 percent level.
Table 2 also shows that the results are not particularly sensitive to the variations
in model speciﬁcation that we consider. The estimates and standard deviations of
β are similar, and the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations explain similar fractions of the
current account volatility.
The real-world current account data is displayed in Figure 2, together with the
values generated by the simulation model and the predicted values from the regres-
sions. From these graphs, it is clear that the model does not explain high-frequency
current account ﬂuctuations. The data also contain some episodes of extreme cur-
rent account deﬁcits, like those in Ireland and Portugal around 1980. As expected,
these episodes were not demographically motivated. Maybe surprisingly, however,
the huge current account surplus in Switzerland is captured by the model. Switzer-
land’s transition towards an elderly population has progressed further than in other
countries. The fraction of prime-age workers (aged 45-60) continually increased
and the fraction of young adults fell sharply during the 1990’s. There was thus
an increasing number of savers and a falling fraction of borrowers in the economy,
resulting in a signiﬁcant current account surplus.
Capital ﬂows between the United States and Japan has received attention both in
the popular and in the academic debate, in particular because of the persistent
current account and trade surplus in Japan and corresponding deﬁcits in the United
States (see the top-left panel in Figure 3). Has demographic developments been an
important factor behind these capital ﬂows? Our model suggests that it indeed may
have been. The remaining panels of Figure 3 show capital ﬂows implied by diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations.
8The Japanese current account balance is larger than the American balance for all
model speciﬁcations. In the baseline speciﬁcation, both countries run current ac-
count surpluses during the 1980’s and 1990’s. The developing world is the primary
recipient of capital in this model speciﬁcation. By focusing only on OECD coun-
tries we bring the model implications more in line with the data. The lower-left
panel shows that the United States then runs current account deﬁcits for most of
the period, as in the data.8 The Japanese capital ﬂows are however counterfactually
large. The lower-right panel in Figure 3 indicates that introducing a small pension
system in the model reduces capital ﬂows. The pension system substitutes for some
of the life-cycle savings and reduces aggregate wealth. As a result, the magnitude
of capital ﬂows is smaller and more similar to what we see in the data.9
5P r o j e c t i o n s
In this section, we use the theoretical model and the regression results to assess
the demographic eﬀect on future capital ﬂows. Figure 4 shows current account
projections based on the baseline model speciﬁcation.
The model predicts current account improvements in Southern Europe and Ireland
and a downward pressure on the current accounts in the United States and Scan-
dinavia during the coming one or two decades. These capital ﬂows are explained
by the relative timing of population aging in the diﬀerent countries. The former
group of countries will see an increasing fraction of prime-age workers in the coming
decades, with a peak after 2020, while the fraction of prime-age workers has already
peaked or is just about to peak in the latter group of countries. These predictions
are thus consistent with empirical studies of the relationship between the current
account and the age structure in a country. For example Higgins (1998) ﬁnds that
a large fraction of prime-age workers implies a current account surplus.
We want to point out that the current account projections reported in Figure 4
should not be used as forecasts of future capital ﬂows. First, as we have found in
this paper, the demographic development only explains part of the historical data.
Moreover, and more importantly, policy reforms will most likely be necessary in
many countries if the demographic change turns out to be as dramatic as predicted.
Such reforms (for example pension reforms) could substantially aﬀect capital ﬂows.
Our projections focus on the direct impact from demographics to capital ﬂows and
ignores indirect eﬀects from policy changes. The model is however well suited also
for analyzing policy reforms.
8When excluding developping countries, our model predicts capital ﬂows for the U.S. and Japan
that are similar to those in Feroli (2002) and Henriksen (2002). Neither Feroli nor Henriksen allows
for capital ﬂows to developping countries.
9Introducing a pension system improves current-account levels not only in the U.S. and Japan,
but in most countries.
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Figure 4: Current Account Projections